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Abstract.  Conventional analysis of the economics of environmental policy usually 
claims that emission taxes induce a stronger incentive for an improvement in pollution 
abatement technologies compared to emission standards. In contrast, recent empirical 
studies reveal that there is no systematic relationship between improvements in pollu-
tion abatement technologies and the policy instrument chosen. The present paper tries to 
clarify this contradiction. In the first step the paper shows that the conventional model 
of innovation in pollution control under different policy regimes is deficient in at least 
two ways: It neglects policy impacts on the firms’ output level and it assumes a rather 
unrealistic type of emission standard. In the second step the paper presents a more 
elaborated model which tries to overcome these shortcomings. Using this model it is 
shown that the impact on innovation in pollution control caused by taxes and standards 
strongly depends on the scale of technical progress as well as on the cost structure of the 
firm under consideration such that there is no unique ranking of the two policies. Fi-
nally, the paper discusses the policy implications of these findings.  
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1  Introduction 
Conventional analysis of the economics of environmental policy instruments usually claims 
that emission taxes induce a higher incentive for improvements in pollution abatement tech-
nologies relative to emission standards.
1 This claim is justified by the fact that under a tax pol-
icy there is a positive price for every unit of pollutants whereas emission standards imply a 
price of zero in the case of compliance. Besides the well known static efficiency properties 
this advantage in terms of promoting technological change leads most economists to prefer 
market based instruments like emission taxes rather than direct controls like emission stan-
dards. In contrast, recent empirical studies within the field of environmental policy and tech-
nological progress
2 come to the result that there is no systematic relationship between im-
provements in pollution abatement technologies and the policy instrument chosen (see, e.g., 
Hemmelskamp 2000).  
In the following we try to shed some light on this puzzling issue. In Section 2 we argue that 
the conventional approach of innovation in pollution control suffers from two deficiencies 
which lead to a systematic bias in favour of emission taxes: It neglects environmental policy 
impacts on the firms’ output level and it employs a rather unrealistic description of emission 
standards. In Section 3 we lay out an extended approach which overcomes these deficiencies 
by explicitly accounting for output reactions and employing a more realistic description of 
emission standards. Using this approach we show in Section 4 that the impact on innovation 
in pollution control caused by taxes and standards depends crucially on the scale of techno-
logical progress as well as on the cost structure of the firm under consideration such that there 
is no unique ranking between the different instruments. In Section 5 we discuss the policy 
conclusions to be drawn from our results.  
2  The conventional approach  
The conventional approach of innovation in pollution control under different policy regimes 
can be traced back to the early seventies (see Zerbe, 1970; Wenders, 1975). In the following 
period this approach has been taken up and partially refined by various authors without 
changing its basic assumptions (e.g., Downing/White, 1986; Milliman/Prince, 1989). Starting 
point is a competitive industry which consists of a large number of firms that emit a homoge-
nous pollutant into the environment. Emissions caused by a representative firm within this in-
dustry are denoted by E. Prior to innovation marginal abatement cost associated with incre-
mental reductions in E are given by MC1(E). Without environmental regulation the firm under 
consideration would emit E0 pollution units. The pollution control authority levies an emis-
sion tax of t1 per unit of emitted pollutants or imposes an emission standard that allows only 
                                                           
1   For the conventional approach see, e.g., Zerbe (1970), Wenders (1975), Downing/White (1986) and Milli-
man/ Prince (1989). A more sophisticated analysis is offered by Requate (1998) who, however, concentrates 
on dynamic welfare aspects of taxes and tradeable emission permits. 
2   For the purpose of the following analysis it is not necessary to distinguish between technical/technological 
progress and innovation; we therefore use these expressions synonymously.   2
E1 units to be emitted per firm and time period.
3 As shown in figure 1, this induces abatement 
cost of E1E0A. However, in the case of the emission tax the firm has additionally to bear the 
tax burden amounting to 0E1At1, such that total cost are given by 0E0At1. Now let the firm un-
der consideration develop an innovation in pollution control which shifts its marginal cost 
curve from MC1(E) to MC2(E). The resulting cost savings are CE0A under the emission stan-
dard and BE0A under the emission tax, where the latter induces the firm to reduce emissions 
after innovation from E1 to E2. Due to BE0A>CE0A it can be concluded from this simple 
graphical analysis that an emission tax provides a higher incentive to innovate relative to an 
emission standard.
4  






















Figure 1: The conventional approach of innovation in pollution control. 
Although the above analysis is compelling at first glance due to its simplicity and vividness, it 
suffers from two deficiencies. The first and more fundamental one is related to the fact that 
the conventional approach assumes a fixed output level and concentrates entirely on minimis-
ing pure abatement cost caused by so-called “end of pipe”-measures (plus transfers in the case 
of an emission tax).
5 However, different policy instruments like taxes and standards will in-
duce different output levels such that the impact of innovation on profits also depends on the 
policy instruments chosen. As a consequence, the appropriate measure of the incentive to in-
novate is not given by reductions in pure abatement cost (including tax transfers), as assumed 
above, but by increases in profits. Obviously, this cannot be analysed by simple graphical 
means like figure 1 since true “abatement cost” in terms of profits forgone depend on the pol-
icy instrument chosen and for different instruments one would obtain different abatement cost 
curves.  
                                                           
3   Using the above model various authors have also analysed emission control subsidies and tradeable permits. 
These instruments are suppressed here because they are outside the scope of the following considerations.   
4   If the new technology spreads across the industry and the authority tries to stick with the initial level of emis-
sions, it will lower the tax rate which even reinforces the above arguments in favour of an emission tax. 
5   This shortcoming has also been recognized be Requate (1998) who, however, concentrates on taxes and 
tradeable permits and uses a model somewhat different from our model developed in the next Section.    3
The second deficiency relates to the description of the emission standard. As customary in the 
pollution control literature the approach above employs an emission standard which is fixed in 
terms of absolute quantities like, e.g., tons per year. In practice, however, emission standards 
regularly are fixed in terms of the concentration of pollutants in waste water or waste gas, re-
spectively. The reason is that standards in terms of concentrations can equally be applied to a 
wide range of different sources whereas standards in terms of absolute quantities would have 
to be differentiated according to the size of each single emission source. Such a differentia-
tion, however, would hamper the process of environmental policy making by requiring a vast 
amount of information and possibly provoking lengthy discussions between governmental au-
thorities and the firms or industries involved.  
Summing up we conclude that the conventional model of innovation in pollution control un-
der different policy regimes is based on doubtful assumptions about the optimization behav-
iour of the innovating firm as well as about the nature of the emission standard. Policy rec-
ommendations extracted from this model should therefore be handled with care. In the follow-
ing section we will draw up a more elaborated model that avoids these shortcomings.
6 Using 
this model we will again compare the incentives for improvements in pollution abatement 
technologies under emission taxes and standards.
7 
3  The model 
3.1  Basic assumptions 
Consider again a firm within a competitive industry which consists of a large number of firms 
emitting a homogenous pollutant into the environment. Denote the output of the firm under 
consideration by y and the market price by p. Assume that production cost are given by a con-
tinuous cost function c  that satisfies the usual assumption of increasing marginal cost, i.e. 
 and  . Let ε>0 indicate the amount of pollutants emitted per unit of output 
before any abatement by “end of pipe”-measures. Denote the amount of pollutants abated by v 
and the amount of pollutants finally emitted to the environment by e, i.e.: e . Finally, 
assume that the cost of abatement by “end of pipe”-measures are given by a continuous cost 
function   that also exhibits increasing marginal cost: 
] y [ 1
0 0 ] y [ c1 > ′ ] y [ c1 > ′ ′
]
v y− ε =
v [ c2 0 ] v [ c2 > ′  and c . Without 
any environmental regulation the firm would choose v=0 and emissions would amount to e
0 > ] v [ ′ ′ 2
max.   
The pollution control authority levies an emission tax of t per unit of emitted pollutant or im-
poses an emission standard. In contrast to the conventional approach described in Section 2, 
the latter is fixed in terms of the concentration of pollutants in waste water or waste gas, re-
spectively. Assuming a linear relationship between output y and the amount of waste water or 
waste gas, this translates into an emission standard that allows a maximum of  ε < ε  units of 
pollutants per unit of output. Hence, the amount of pollutants to be abated is given by 
). ( y v ε − ε =  In order to ensure comparability of the two policy instruments we assume that 
both instruments initially (i.e. prior to innovation) are adjusted in such a way that profit 
                                                           
6   The following model is a generalized version of a more simple precursor presented by Michaelis (2004).  
7   We do not explicitly consider tradeable emission permits because within the framework of the following 
model the incentives to innovate are the same under taxes and tradeable permits.    4
maximization by the firm leads to the same amount of pollutants finally emitted to the envi-
ronment, denoted by en. Obviously, under this assumption a comparison of instruments only 
makes sense if the regulation under consideration actually has an impact on emissions (i.e., 
ε < ε  or t>0, respectively, such that e  and if at least one marginal unit of pollutants 
is left over after complying with it (i.e.,  . We therefore restrict the following analysis 
to cases satisfying 0  prior to innovation. 
) emax
n <
0 en > )
max
n e < e <
] v [ c ] y [ c 2 1 −
∗ s y
)]. ( y [ c ) ( s 2 ′ ε − ε ∗




] e y [ c n t 2 −
n e −
ε ′ ε ∗
∗
t
                             
3.2 Profit maximization 
In contrast to the conventional approach presented in Section 2 which assumes a fixed output 
level, in our model the firm under consideration is endowed with two possible measures for 
reducing emissions. Emissions can be reduced by reducing output and/or by means of “end of 
pipe” treatment. In the case of the emission standard the firm seeks to maximize the profit 
function   subject to the constraint v=y(ε– py s − = π ε ). This leads to the following 
optimality condition where   indicates the optimal output under the emission standard: 
(1)  ] y [ c p s 1 ε − ε + ′ = ∗     
This condition requires to equalize price and marginal cost. The latter are composed of two 
parts: marginal cost of production plus marginal cost caused by the abatement of  ) ( ε − ε  addi-
tional units of the pollutant under consideration. Substituting  ) ( ys ε ε− ∗  by   yields: n s e y − ∗ ε
8 
(2)  e ] y [ c p n s 1 − + ′ = ∗     





leads to the following optimality conditions where   and   indicate the optimal output 
and the optimal amount of abatement, respectively: 
(3)  .  ] y [ c p t 1 + ′ = ∗
(4)    . t ] v [ c t 2 = ′ ∗
Condition (3) requires to equalize price and marginal production cost plus marginal tax bur-
den; condition (4) requires to equalize marginal abatement cost and the tax rate. Combining 
together and substituting   by   yields: t y ε ∗  9 
(5)  ] y [ c p t 1 + ′ = ∗ . 
Since marginal cost of production as well as marginal cost of pollution abatement are mono-
tonic increasing functions of y, there exist unique solutions for   and  , respectively. 
Moreover, comparing (2) and (5) reveals that due to increasing marginal cost the output level 
under the standard is always higher than the output level under the tax regime:  > . Since 




∗ s y ∗
t y
n, this implies also 
>  and π > .      ∗ s v ∗
t v ∗ s π
                              
8   Remember that both instruments are adjusted in such a way that they lead to emissions of en units of the pol-
lutant under consideration. Consequently, we obtain  . Together with  ∗ − ∗ ε = s s n v y e ∗ ∗ ε − ε = s s y ) ( v  this im-
plies  n s s e y ) ( y − ε = ε − ε ∗ ∗  
9   In the Appendix it is shown, that en is a continuously changing function in t. Hence, the control authority can 
achieve any non-negative level of en by choosing the appropriate level of t.   5
4  Incentives to innovate 
In principle, the above model allows to analyse two different types of technological progress 
in pollution control: cost saving progress in “end of pipe”-treatment which shifts down the 
cost function c2[v] and pollution saving progress in the production process itself which shifts 
down the emission coefficient ε. The following analysis concentrates on the latter case since 
there is ample evidence to assume that “end of pipe”-technologies are almost fully devel-
oped,
10 whereas changes in the production process itself still offer a wide range of opportuni-
ties to reduce emissions (see, e.g., German Council of Environmental Advisors 1994, pp.134). 
Moreover, “end of pipe”-measures usually lead only to a shift of pollutants between the dif-
ferent environmental media whereas by changes in the production process itself it is possible 
to reduce the generated amount of pollutants at its origin.  
In the following we assume that the firm under consideration has developed or discovered an 
innovation which reduces the amount of pollution generated per unit of output without chang-
ing production cost. We then ask how the firm’s profit level would be affected by adopting 
this new technology under the different policy regimes.
11 In doing so, we differentiate be-
tween a marginal and a non-marginal decrease in ε. However, particularly with respect to the 
latter case an important caveat associated with the possibility of diffusion should be noted 
(see, e.g., Milliman/Prince, 1989): Although the firm under consideration is small in terms of 
its contribution to total emissions, it cannot be ruled out that the innovation once adopted will 
spread across the industry thereby altering total emissions. If this happens, the pollution con-
trol authority might recognise the change in total emissions and adjust the standard or the tax 
rate, respectively. In principle, the firm under consideration should try to anticipate this effect 
when deciding whether or not to adopt the innovation. In practice, however, such a degree of 
“clairvoyance” seems extremely unrealistic since it implies complete information and a proc-
ess of political decision making which follows well understandable patterns. Both assump-
tions are violated in reality. No innovating firm possess sufficient information in order to 
completely anticipate the speed and degree of diffusion and even highly sophisticated scholars 
in political economy are far from understanding the whole complexity of the process of politi-
cal decision making. Therefore, the following analysis supposes that the innovating firm cal-
culates the private value of innovation under the assumption that the standard or the tax rate, 
respectively, will remain unchanged.  
4.1  Marginal technological progress 
In this section we assume an innovation which leads only to a marginal decrease in ε. The in-
centive to innovate is then represented by the first derivate of the profit function. A reduction 
                                                           
10   An important exception are recent attempts to develop “end of pipe”-measures for removing CO2-emissions 
from power plants and similar facilities (see, e.g., Grimston et al., 2001).  
11   It should be noted that the following analysis is not concerned with optimal investments in R&D from the so-
cial point of view. Instead, we follow Milliman/Prince (1989) and look only at the private value of an innova-
tion once it has been found. In comparing environmental policy instruments this approach is sufficient, since 
R&D expenditures for a given project do not depend on the instrument employed by the control authority 
(see, e.g., Downing/White, 1986, p.21).   6
of ε induces three effects on profits. First, two indirect effects through changing the optimal 
level of production and abatement and second a direct effect on profits. However, due to the 
envelope theorem the two indirect effects of a marginal change in ε can be disregarded such 
that only the direct effect on profits remains (e.g. Sydsaeter et al. 2000, p. 94). Consequently, 
in the case of an emission standard differentiating the corresponding Lagrangian function 









s s + ε − λ + = − −
L ∂ (6)  *
s
s y λ − =
ε ∂
. 
Moreover, the Lagrangian multiplier λ satisfies the following first order condition of profit 
maximization:  . Inserting into (6) yields the change in profits and thereby the in-
centive to innovate in the case of an emission standard:  
















12                
Under taxation the profit function is given by  . Again 
using the envelope theorem yields: 









t t − ε + = π − −
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where t satisfies the following first order condition of profit maximization: t . ] [
* '
2 t v c =
13 In-
serting into (8) yields the incentive to innovate in the case of taxation: 










Comparing (7) and (9) in view of  >  and  >  as derived in Section 3.2 reveals that 
for a marginal decrease in ε an emission standard always provides a higher incentive to inno-
vate relative to an emission tax: 
∗ s y ∗







Π ∂ t .  
4.2  Non-marginal technological progress 
For analysing non-marginal technological progress we introduce a parameter α  meas-
uring the degree of technological progress. I.e., the level of the emission coefficient after in-
novation is given by   where ε still indicates the initial level prior to innovation. As a 
consequence, in the case of an emission standard which remains unchanged the profit function 
after innovation is given by: 
] 1 , 0 ] ∈
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12  Note, that the incentive to innovate is always positive, since technological progress implies a decrease in ε. 
13   It should be noted, that this condition always holds prior to innovation since we have assumed 0<en<e
max.    7
With respect to the interpretation of (11) it should be noted that no further pollution control is 
necessary if  ε ε − ε ≥ / ) ( α  such that the emission coefficient decreases to a level  ε ≤ ε α − ) 1 ( . 
Under these circumstances profits reach the upper bound indicated by the unregulated case 
such that further technological progress beyond this level would add nothing more to profits.  
Regarding the profit function after innovation in the case of an unchanged emission tax t>0 
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if ] y ) 1 [( c ] y [ c py
















t .       
For  α < α
c t =
 a strictly positive amount of emissions remains after abatement such that the con-
dition   holds. In contrast, for  ] v [ t 2
∗ ′ α ≥ α  the decrease in the emission coefficient ε is so 
strong that for the given tax rate it is profitable to abate all emissions and no more tax is paid. 
The latter situation occurs if marginal abatement costs for the last unit of emission caused by 
production are smaller than the tax rate:  .   ] vt
∗ [ c t 2 ′ >
Using (11) and (12) the incentive to innovate can be calculated as the difference in profits af-
ter (α>0) and before (α=0) innovation. Differentiating (11) and (12) with respect to α and 
employing the envelope theorem, these differences in profits can also be expressed as inte-
grals between zero and say α'. Consequently, we obtain for the case of an emission standard 
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The second addend in the second part of (14) shows the increase in profits when   is still 
raised and all additional emissions are fully abated. Note, that this expression is independent 
of the tax rate, since no taxes are paid. Consequently the output level depends only on mar-
ginal production and marginal abatement costs. (13) and (14) are continuous as well as 
*
t y
monotonously increasing functions in α, except for innovations with  ε ε − ε ≥ α / ) (  in the case 
of an emission standard, where the incentive to innovate is constant.  
Now suppose a ”total” innovation with  1 = α . For this case, (11) and (12) show that both in-
struments lead to the same level of profits after innovation. Clearly, taxes and standards are   8
equal, if emissions can be abated without any costs. Moreover, in Section 3.2 it has been 
shown, that before innovation profits under an emission standard always exceed profits under 
taxation if both instruments lead to the same emission level en. As a consequence, for the case 
of a “total” innovation with α=1 an emission tax always provides a higher incentive to inno-
vate relative to an emission standard:  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( s t = α π ∆ > = α π ∆ .
14 Contrary, in the case of a 
marginal innovation with α→0 in Section 4.1 for the incentive to innovate the reverse order 
has been observed:  ) 0 → ( ) 0 ( t s α π ∆ > → α π ∆ . Together with the continuity of   and  s π ∆ t π ∆  
these two results imply the existence of at least one α* satisfying  *) ( a α π ∆ =  in the 
range of 0<α<1 (see Figure 2). As a consequence, the incentive to innovate under emission 
standards and taxes crucially depends on the extent to which technological progress decreases 
the emission coefficient ε. For a relative small decrease (α<α*) an emission standard provides 
a higher incentive to innovate compared to an emission tax, whereas for a relatively large de-
crease (α>α*) the reverse is true. Moreover, the magnitude of α* depends not only on the 
strength of environmental policy (
*) ∆ ( t α π
ε
                            
 or t, respectively) but also on the individual costs of pro-
duction and abatement of the firm under consideration. Therefore, generalized conclusions 
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Figure 2: Incentives to innovate in the case of non-marginal technical progress. 
5.  Summary and conclusions  
Conventional analysis of the economics of environmental policy instruments usually claims 
that emission taxes induce a higher incentive for improvements in pollution abatement tech-
nologies relative to emission standards. This result, however, crucially depends on some 
rather unrealistic assumptions. Using a more realistic model, which explicitly accounts for 
output markets and employs a more elaborated description of emission standards, the above 
                              
14  The reason for this result are the additional tax payments which can be economized unlike if an emission 
standard is applied.   9
analysis has shown that there is no unique ranking between taxes and standards with respect 
to the induced incentive to innovate. Which instrument provides a higher incentive to inno-
vate depends on the specific circumstances of the case under consideration and in particular 
on the specific patterns of technological progress: If technological progress is expected to 
come as a “big bang” (implying a large α in our model), then the conventional view holds and 
emission taxes induce a higher incentive to innovate compared to emission standards. How-
ever, the reverse is true if technological progress is expected to come as a sequence of com-
paratively small steps independent of each other (implying a small α in our model). As a con-
sequence, no general political advice can be given in favour of taxes or standards and there 
might emerge a dilemma concerning the choice of the appropriate instrument: Whereas emis-
sion taxes - even if one explicitely considers output reactions - exhibit strong advantages con-
cerning economic efficiency (see, e.g., Katsoulacos/Xepapadeas, 1996, p.6), it cannot be ruled 
out that under certain circumstances emission standards might induce a higher incentive to in-
novate. In practice, this might lead to a conflict between short-term goals concerning eco-
nomic efficiency and long-term goals concerning technological progress. In weighting up 
these goals it should be recognized that, on the one hand, inefficiencies caused by an unique 
emission standard are the smaller the more homogenous are the firms within the regulated in-
dustry. On the other hand, the weight applied to the issue of technological progress should be 
the higher, the larger are the remaining potentials for improvements by innovation (“techno-
logical opportunities” in the sense of Klevorick et al., 1995). As a consequence, in cases 
where firms are sufficiently homogenous, technological opportunities are large and improve-
ments are expected to come in a continuous “step-by-step” process, it could be quite sensible 
from an economic point of view to use emission standards instead of emission taxes.  
 
Appendix 
We assumed that   and   are monotonously increasing differentiable functions. This 
implies that the reverse functions exist and are also monotonously increasing differentiable 
functions. From (3) and (4), respectively, we obtain: 
] y [ c'
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] v [ c
1














∗        
is also a continuously decreasing function in t.    10
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